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Abstract - Entrepreneurship is predominantly 
associated with the activities of an individual actor – 
the entrepreneur. It has also been related to the 
concept of firm ownership (e.g. Foss and Klein, 
2005). This may lead to the conjecture that a 
collectively-owned firm is a setting for collective 
entrepreneurship. However, such reasoning 
encounters a number of taxing questions. If 
entrepreneurship is usually related to the individual, 
how does the collective embody entrepreneurial 
spirit and lead to effective outcomes? These and 
other questions will be addressed in this paper, 
which is mainly based on a review of the literature. 
The paper starts by providing an overview of the 
different schools of (economic) thought on 
entrepreneurship. Subsequently we discuss the 
implications for the conceptualization of 
entrepreneurship when it is not carried out by an 
individual but by a group of people. Finally, the 
notion of collective entrepreneurship will be framed 
within the context of the producer-owned firm in 
agriculture, by considering conditions under which 
collective entrepreneurship can be attributed to the 
cooperative. 
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I. INTRODUCTION1 
 
While entrepreneurship is considered important 
for economic development, not much scholarly 
attention has been given to the issue of 
entrepreneurship in producer-owned firms, such as 
in agricultural cooperatives. Entrepreneurship in 
these types of firms may be called collective 
entrepreneurship because a producer-owned firm 
entrepreneurship may be located at the level of the 
multiple producer-owners and at the level of the 
jointly-owned firm. 
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 Paper presented at the 12th Congress of the European 
Association of Agricultural Economists (EAAE), 
Ghent, Belgium, August 26-29, 2008, Organized 
Seesion on Collective Entrepreneurship 
Cook and Plunkett (2006) have been one of the first 
to relate the concept of collective entrepreneurship to 
the agricultural cooperative. They consider collective 
entrepreneurship as a new phenomenon for 
agricultural cooperatives and define it as “a form of 
rent-seeking behavior exhibited by formal groups of 
individual agricultural producers that combine the 
institutional frameworks of investor-driven 
shareholder firms and patron-driven forms of 
collective action.” (p. 421). In other words, Cook and 
Plunkett explore the emergence of jointly-owned 
firms where entrepreneurial activity takes place at 
different levels of the organization, notably at the 
level of the individual member-owners and at the 
level of the jointly-owned firm. Their paper places the 
interaction between complex organizational structures 
and the concept of entrepreneurship on the academic 
agenda. However, the paper does not explore the 
extent to which jointly-owned multi-level 
organizations affect the performance of 
entrepreneurship; neither does the paper explain what 
impact these different loci of entrepreneurship have 
on the coherence and therefore manageability of the 
organization. 
Scholars of theory and practice of agricultural 
cooperatives have claimed that many of these 
organizations are restructuring towards more 
“entrepreneurial” organizational model. Nilsson 
(1999) presents a typology of cooperative models, 
making a distinction between the traditional 
cooperative model and a group of four so-called 
entrepreneurial models. The latter are different from 
the traditional model (and from each other) in the 
financial structure they use to attract additional equity 
capital. Nilsson has named these new structures 
entrepreneurial models, because when cooperatives 
seek to become (more) entrepreneurial they need 
additional risk capital, which they obtain by 
implementing an innovative financial structure.  
 Entrepreneurship in a cooperative can reside with 
the farmers (as owners of the CF), with the managers 
of the CF, or with both. What are the implications for 
the efficiency of the organization of placing 
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entrepreneurship at one or the other level in the 
organization? Traditionally, cooperatives have 
been established on the basis of the principle that 
the members are individual and independent 
entrepreneurs who collectively decide on the 
activities of the CF. The latter has always been 
treated as a dependent firm (Bonus, 1986), that 
mainly carries out what the members, through the 
board of directors, have decided. Van Dijk (1999) 
posits that the double-layer organizational form 
entails also a two-layer system of 
entrepreneurship. He then argues that when market 
conditions for agricultural cooperatives change, as 
they have in the 1980s and 1990s, the lead in 
entrepreneurial activities should shift from the 
member of the cooperative to the CF, or even to 
the subsidiaries of the CF. The author, however, 
does not elaborate on what entrepreneurship means 
in such complex organizational structure, or how a 
shift in entrepreneurship relates to the ownership 
structure.  
 It is the objective of this paper to further explore 
the relationship between multi-level 
entrepreneurship and organizational structure, 
particularly for organizations that are characterized 
by multiple ownership of assets. More specifically, 
the paper defines entrepreneurship and the 
entrepreneurship function; it discusses the 
characteristics of collective entrepreneurship, and 
makes a distinction between collective 
entrepreneurship and cooperative 
entrepreneurship. In addition, the paper seeks to 
clarify the distinction between entrepreneurship 
and quasi-entrepreneurship. 
 
II. ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN ECONOMICS 
 
Entrepreneurship is a huge conundrum for 
economic theory. It has long been recognized that 
the entrepreneurial function is a vital component in 
the process of economic growth (Baumol, 1968), 
and one of the “well-springs of economic 
progress” (Buchanan and Di Piero, 1980). All the 
more striking is the absence of entrepreneurship 
from received theories in economics. 
(Micro)economics is directed mainly towards 
solving problems of optimization, assuming 
complete information on options in means to ends 
frameworks and on the outcomes of choice. There 
is no room for entrepreneurship in such theories 
where every actor’s moves are restricted by the 
dictates of optimality calculations (Baumol, 1993). 
Stevenson and Harmeling (1990) even posit that 
entrepreneurship is best studied in the context of 
theories of change and best kept out of the theories of 
equilibrium, implicitly stating that economics is ill-
equipped to analyze the phenomenon. 
 Contrary to these observations there is a growing 
body of literature which seeks to find ways to 
incorporate entrepreneurship in economic theory and 
link it to the theory of the firm (e.g. Hébert and Link, 
1988; Foss and Klein, 2004; Casson, 2005). Based on 
this literature, the line of enquiry in the current paper 
will examine whether entrepreneurship can be 
attributed to a collectively owned firm. Specifically, 
we will focus on attribution in the most complex case 
of collective ownership, namely the producer-owned 
firm, where the performance of the producers’ own 
assets and the collectively owned assets are mutually 
dependent. 
 Forecasting in economic theory is driven by the 
premise of the omnipresent force of equilibration 
which is used to predict outcomes in fitting scarce 
means to desired ends. Knight (1921) commends this 
framework for its analytical rigor and explanatory 
capacity, but challenges it at the same time by stating 
that equilibrium is the direction in which markets tend 
to allocate resources. Equilibrium is a state which is 
likely never to be reached. Perfect competition would 
only hold in a situation where the present state of the 
world would be exactly the same as the future. In real 
life this is clearly not the case, as the future is likely to 
show change from the state of the past and is thus 
uncertain.  
 Although all future events entail uncertainty to a 
certain degree, not all future events are equally 
uncertain. Knight (ibid) argues that events that have 
been recorded to happen can be objectively grouped 
into fairly homogenous classes of cases. These 
instances (eventually) allow for objective description, 
can be measured and thus be anticipated. They could 
even be insured against by trading off the risk of the 
large loss with the certain payment of smaller fixed 
sum. These ‘insurable uncertainties’ form a lesser 
degree of uncertainty to which the more suitable term 
of risk should be applied. True uncertainties, 
however, concern future events whose outcomes 
cannot be objectively classified and for which there is 
no basis for assigning probabilities to those outcomes 
(Langlois and Cosgel, 1993).  
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 The contention that uncertainty is a different 
entity from risk has some profound  implications.2 
Because the fruits of current production can only 
be enjoyed with future sales of goods, uncertainty 
influences decision-making in production. In 
situations where it is difficult to objectively arrive 
at a classification of possible outcomes, decision-
making must be left to personal judgment. Correct 
judgment of future events will then result in 
superior allocation of resources as compared to 
false judgment.  
 Changes in conditions upset anticipations and 
create a divergence between costs of production 
and selling prices, giving rise to the un-
equilibrateable phenomenon of profit.3 Given the 
nature of profit, judgment cannot be assessed in 
terms of a marginal product and therefore cannot 
be traded on the market, nor paid in a wage 
(Knight, 1921). In order to exercise judgment over 
the deployment of assets, the decision-maker must 
have these assets in possession. Judgment is then 
naturally tied to asset ownership (Foss and Klein, 
2004). Consequent to this analogy, profits (or 
losses for that matter) are the returns to judgment. 
 Entrepreneurship is thus defined as judgmental 
decision-making about the deployment of assets in 
the face of Knightian uncertainty (Foss and Klein, 
2005). The actor owning the assets and exercising 
judgment over the use these assets is the true 
entrepreneur. This issue of combining asset 
ownership and judgmental decision-making has 
                                                 
2
 The concept of uncertainty is difficult to grasp. We 
are still to face a great debate on modes of describing 
uncertainty and individual behavior in making choices. 
Opponents to the concept of uncertainty, notably Arrow 
(1951), argue that Knight’s uncertainties seem to have a 
lot of similarity with ordinary probabilities, especially 
in the sense that Knight describes how uncertainties are 
reducible by the consolidation of many cases, analogous 
to the law of large numbers. 
3
 It should be noted that the notion of profit contrasts 
with the concept of rent. In ascertaining economic rent, 
productivity of different resources or of a resource in 
different uses are compared (Rumelt, 2005). The 
common treatment of rent is to ascribe it fully to the 
scarce factor, and then to treat that factor as separately 
owned, so that rent becomes part of the firm’s costs. If 
the scarce factor is then traded, rents are capitalized and 
no profit is shown, corresponding to the zero-profit 
condition of neoclassical theory. Rents, unlike profits as 
risk, unlike uncertainty, would persist in static 
equilibrium. 
important implications for economic organization. To 
understand how entrepreneurship relates to the 
organization of the firm, we must look in more detail 
at the characteristics of entrepreneurship. 
 
III. THE ENTREPRENEURSHIP FUNCTION 
 
The concept of entrepreneurship as a term is applied 
in a seemingly endless variety of ways, not only 
between scientific disciplines, but even within 
disciplines. The underlying difference lies in the 
views that are used to portray entrepreneurship. Foss 
and Klein (2008) aptly differentiate between 
occupational, structural and functional views.  The 
first refers to a pure personification, focusing on self-
employment. Research is generally related to argued 
factors (or traits) that lead to success or failure of 
entrepreneurial ventures (e.g. Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000). The second approach focuses 
on firm behavior, attempting to explain why firms, 
clusters, sectors or even an economy as a whole can 
be labeled as entrepreneurial. This type of research 
takes the concept of entrepreneurship into the domain 
of strategic management (e.g. Gartner, 1988; 
Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). The third category treats 
entrepreneurship as a function. The merit of the 
functional perspective is that it allows closer 
examination of the instinctive notion that the act of 
entrepreneurship is not provisional on being fully 
incarnated as the entrepreneur. Neither is it solely the 
expression of (strategic) organizational behavior. The 
functional perspective rather considers 
entrepreneurship as a function which any economic 
actor may exhibit. 
 The functional perspective can be found in various 
lines of economic thinking on entrepreneurship. Most 
commonly it is considered in the functional aspects of 
management, leadership, alertness, or innovation. 
Although these functional aspects support empirical 
identification of the entrepreneurship function, they 
ascribe adjective qualifications to it. Moreover, they 
invoke exclusive properties to the entrepreneurship 
function, when empirical observations indicate 
otherwise (Thornton, 1999). Despite the fact that 
these mentioned functional aspects attempt to 
illuminate the entrepreneurship function, the question 
still remains what the entrepreneurship function is. 
 Contrary to the mentioned functional aspects, 
judgment is not a qualification. Judgment can be 
found in any circumstance of decision-making under 
uncertainty within any actor. Judgment could be 
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exercised independently from other elements of 
the entrepreneurship function, whether decision-
making involves leadership, creativity and 
innovation, alertness or not (Foss and Klein, 
2008). It is thus judgment that constitutes the 
essence of the entrepreneurship function. 
Though the entrepreneur represents the single 
actor exercising the entrepreneurship function, the 
latter’s characteristics do not confine it to a single 
actor. Entrepreneurship as a function can made 
transferable, for instance through an employment 
relationship. Effectively, the transfer of the 
entrepreneurship function entails the delegation of 
decision-making rights to subordinates, allowing 
them to exercise their own judgment, though in 
derived form from that of the original judgment of 
the asset owner (Foss, Foss & Klein, 2007). 
 In sum, entrepreneurship is the function of 
judgment decision-making under uncertainty over 
the deployment of assets. Entrepreneurship is a 
function rather than an attribute of economic 
actors, and it is expressed through ownership and 
control over assets. We now arrive at the question 
how entrepreneurship can be attributed to the firm, 
and whether this is influenced by its organizational 
form. For this enquiry we need to briefly examine 
the facets of ownership and control of a firm. 
 
IV. THE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
FUNCTION AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
FORM 
 
Ownership of a firm is in an economic sense a 
straightforward phenomenon, implying the 
possession of property rights over a firm’s assets. 
The exercise of control over those assets is 
decidedly more complex. The exercise of control 
over assets is practiced through two distinctive 
components of control, namely decision control 
(ratification and monitoring) and decision 
management (initiation and implementation) 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). The entrepreneurship 
function thus consists of three different 
components: ownership, decision control, and 
decision management. These components can 
reside with one person, or can be distributed over 
different people in a complex organizational 
structure (see Figure 1). 
 
 
   The Entrepreneurship Function     Type of Firm 
Ownership and Control 
Owner/Manager 
Single 
Proprietor 
 
Ownership 
Shareholders 
Control 
Managers 
Limited 
Liability 
Company 
(Ltd) 
 
Ownership 
Shareholders 
Decision 
Control 
Board of 
Directors 
Decision 
Management 
Managers 
Public 
Limited 
Company 
(Plc) 
 
Figure 1: The Entrepreneurship Function Divided 
 
 
To demonstrate the ramifications of organizational 
form for the entrepreneurship function, we just have 
to look at the two opposing cases of the manager-
owned firm and the publicly listed shareholder-owned 
firm (the Plc). In the Plc, control is delegated to the 
managers of the firm to such an extent that the firm’s 
owners exercise decision control to a limited extent 
(e.g. via ratification at the Annual Meeting). The 
board represents the owners and takes up the lion’s 
share of decision control. The managers fully exercise 
decision management. The entrepreneurship function 
in the case of the Plc is thus divided over different 
organizational layers, viz. shareholders, board and 
managers.  
 When decision control and decision management 
are divided between the firm’s governing bodies, the 
owners have fully delegated decision management. 
This permits the managers to take decisions over asset 
deployment without bearing any financial risk. 
Assuming effective control mechanisms that counter 
moral hazard, managers will direct their decisions to 
the (expected) demands of the majority of 
shareholders. As the number of shareholders 
increases, decision-making will require a larger 
degree of objective verifiability in order to provide 
the transparency in decision-making that is required to 
obtain consent of the shareholders. The firm then 
develops towards a state where uncertainties are 
avoided. 
 If the assumption regarding effective control 
mechanisms is relaxed, managers will have more 
freedom in decision-making, as shareholders will not 
be able to assess every step of the management. This 
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situation increases the likelihood that managers 
will, in pursuit of their own interest, make 
decisions that deviate from shareholder interests. 
This can for instance be related to the phenomenon 
of empire-building by managers or in the 
widespread failure to reap merger benefits. As 
managers do not bear the ultimate responsibility 
regarding the results of its own actions, they have 
no incentive to correctly judge over investment 
decisions. Although it may seem that managers 
make decisions under uncertainty, they basically 
avoid uncertainties, resulting in quasi-
entrepreneurship. In the case that managers follow 
their own interests without taking the interests of 
the owners into account, they pursue false 
entrepreneurship. 
In the case of the manager-owned (or 
owner-managed) firm, the entrepreneurship 
function resides exclusively with a single person, 
giving rise to entrepreneurship in its purest form. 
In exercising judgmental decision-making, the 
manager will take the continuity of the firm into 
consideration as strongly as possible. 
 Although the entrepreneurship function in a Plc 
is divided, it can in potential approximate the 
structure of the entrepreneurship function of the 
manager-owned firm. Through making structural 
linkages in decision-making between owners and 
managers, the entrepreneurship function will be 
brought together. In practice this is seen in the case 
of activist shareholders who demand influence 
over decision-making at the board room level. It 
also applies to cases where managers demand a 
mandate from shareholders for decisions that are 
fundamentally important to the firm. 
 In conclusion we contend that firms that share 
decision-making between the owners and 
managers are entrepreneurial. Firms that allot all 
responsibilities regarding decision initiation and 
implementation to the managers and a large share 
of ratification and monitoring of decisions to the 
board are not entrepreneurial. The firm will then 
either resort to uncertainty avoidance in its 
decision-making, or to inefficient allocation of 
resources. 
 Now we have defined entrepreneurship and the 
entrepreneurship function, and have related those 
concepts to the organizational structure, we may 
proceed to present in more detail what it means to 
have entrepreneurship (a) reside with a group of 
people and (b) reside at different levels in the 
organizational structure. 
 
V. DEFINING COLLECTIVE 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
We use the term collective entrepreneurship when the 
decisions about deployment of assets are taken not by 
an individual but by a group of people. The need to 
take decisions as a group results from the joint 
ownership of assets. Joint ownership leads to joint 
decision-making. This implies that it is not the 
judgment of the individual that applies, but the 
combined judgment of a group of individuals. The 
intra-group differences in judgment over the proper 
use of the joint assets bear on the efficiency of the 
decision-making process. The more heterogeneous the 
judgments, for instance about what constitute good 
investment projects, the more difficult the decision-
making process.  
  Some authors have used the term collaborative 
entrepreneurship. Miles et al. (2005) use the term 
collaborative entrepreneurship to define collaboration 
among entrepreneurial firms in a community or 
network of firms. In their view, collaborative 
entrepreneurship is the matching of underutilized 
resources with unexplored market opportunities to 
commercialize a constant stream of innovation in a 
community of networked firms. The emphasis in 
collaboration among the independent firms in the 
network is on value creation through continuous 
innovation (and not on value distribution). Within the 
community of networked firms there is much trust as 
members treat ideas as a common resource and 
collaboratively exploit capabilities. 
 Both collaborative entrepreneurship and collective 
entrepreneurship comprise of three types of 
relationship. First, the jointly owned venture is an 
economic entity, with economic relations between co-
founders, who provide resources such as labor, skills, 
knowledge, experience and capital, in exchange for 
some share of the return to the enterprise. Second, 
there is an organizational relationship among co-
founders, and between co-founders and joint venture. 
Finally, collective and collaborative entrepreneurship 
involve interpersonal relationships. Collaboration is 
often embedded in existing social and personal 
relationships with friends, neighbors, family, or other 
community members. Typical examples of 
collaborative entrepreneurship are strategic alliances, 
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for instance among firms that share a part of their 
R&D activities, or among firms that collaborate in 
tightly coordinated supply chains (Child et al., 
2005). 
 There are at least three main differences 
between collective entrepreneurship and 
collaborative entrepreneurship. First, in collective 
entrepreneurship the income of the member firms 
depends to a large extent on the performance of the 
jointly-owned firm. In collaborative 
entrepreneurship the jointly-owned firm is much 
more independent. Often, the joint venture is sold, 
after a while, through an IPO, thus becoming 
independent from the parent companies, or it is 
acquired by one of the parent companies. Second, 
collaborative entrepreneurship is more dynamic 
than collective entrepreneurship. Alliances are 
often temporary, and/or partners change often. 
Alliances could even take up a network form. 
Third, in collaborative entrepreneurship the 
emphasis is mainly on (a) learning and knowledge 
exchange or (b) complementary assets. In 
collective entrepreneurship, traditionally the 
emphasis has been on economies of scale and 
scope through joint investment in tangible assets, 
while more recently joint learning has become 
important. 
 
VI. COLLECTIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
AND PRODUCER-OWNED FIRMS 
 
A cooperative has often been described as a two-
layer system, consisting of a group of individual 
firms (farms in the case of an agricultural 
cooperative) who establish an association which 
subsequently sets up a firm to perform economic 
activities for the benefit of the members of the 
association (Draheim, 1955). Following Van Dijk 
(1999) we call the individually owned firm the 
member firm (MF) as the owners are members of 
the cooperative, while the jointly-owned firm is 
called the cooperative firm (CF). The MF is also a 
locus of entrepreneurship, as the owner (the 
farmer) has to decide individually, using her 
individual judgment in the face of uncertainty, 
about the deployment of the assets in the MF.  
 The key characteristic of the system of 
collective entrepreneurship in producer-owned 
firms is that the deployment of the individually-
owned assets of the MF and the deployment of the 
jointly-owned assets of the CF are interdependent.4 
This means that the decisions of the individual 
member-producer about their on-farm activities and 
investments have to be aligned with the decisions on 
the activities and investments of the CF to obtain the 
best result (i.e. the highest performance). This 
alignment (or coordination) requires intensive 
communication between MFs and CF as well as joint-
decision-making. This need for intense coordination 
between MFs and CF makes collective 
entrepreneurship in producer-owned firms into a 
special type of collective entrepreneurship. We may 
call this cooperative entrepreneurship. 
 Is there is difference between cooperative 
entrepreneurship and collective entrepreneurship in a 
joint venture? A joint venture is a legally independent 
firm owned by two or more partners who have 
provided equity and other assets, share in the profits, 
and jointly control the firm. The typical joint venture 
is 50 percent owned by company A and 50 percent 
owned by company B, giving both companies equal 
decision rights. However, a joint venture may have 
more than two owners and the shares (and thus 
decision rights) may not be distributed evenly over 
the owners.  
 While formally a cooperative may have only two 
members, it is more common for a cooperative to 
have a larger membership. Traditionally, decision 
rights were distributed according to the one-member-
one-vote system.5 However, more and more 
deviations from this system can be found. Some 
countries, notably the Netherlands, have always used 
some form of proportionality in decision rights, 
linking the number of votes to the volume of 
patronage.6 Still, the cooperatives that apply 
proportionality have been keen on avoiding too much 
decision rights in the hands of one member. 
Cooperative that have completely abandoned the one-
member-one-vote systems are the so-called new 
generation cooperatives, in which decision-rights are 
tied to volume of transaction (and to ownership shares 
as the latter are directly tied to delivery rights). Thus, 
                                                 
4
 Interdendency means that there are complementarities 
between the activities (or decisions) of two economic 
actors. Doing more of activity A has a positive affect on the 
performance of activity B (Roberts, 2004). 
5
 This decision-making model is still advocated by the 
International Cooperative Alliance (ICA). 
6
 See Van Bekkum and Van Dijk (1997) for an overview of 
European countries applying proportional voting.  
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these new generation cooperatives are 
approximating the joint venture model of 
allocating decision rights. 
 Still, a major difference between a joint venture 
and a model of cooperative entrepreneurship 
remains. The activities of the joint venture are 
usually not crucial for the viability of the parent 
companies. Although at its establishment the 
activities of the joint venture were in line with the 
activities and interests of the parent companies, it 
is usually no problem when the joint venture 
develops non-related activities, as long as they are 
profitable. Thus, in a joint venture the activities of 
the jointly-owned firm and those of the parent 
firms are not necessarily interdependent and the 
relationship between parents and jointly-owned 
firm often turns into a financial participation. In 
the cooperative entrepreneurship model, however, 
the relationship between MFs and the CF 
continues to be a complementary one, where the 
performance of the individual MFs crucially 
depends on the quality of the services provided by 
the CF. 
 Heterogeneous views among a group of owners 
of jointly-held assets on how to use these assets 
may have several implications for the outcome and 
efficiency of the decision-making process. The 
impact is particularly dependent on the options that 
owners have to withdraw their ownership share. 
Following Hirschmann (1969), we argue that when 
exit (i.e. selling one’s share of the jointly owned 
assets) is difficult, owners are more likely to 
engage in the decision-making process (‘voice’). 
This is typically the case in agricultural 
cooperatives as members do not easily withdraw; 
they have invested in their cooperative over the 
years, their shares may not be easily transferred (or 
not at all), and alternative trading partners may not 
be available. This commitment of members of the 
cooperative to engage in decision-making about 
the deployment of the assets they jointly own 
leads, in our model, to more entrepreneurship. 
Similarly, those cooperatives where decisions are 
increasingly made by managers, without involving 
the owners in the decision-making process, are less 
entrepreneurial. 
 
 
 
 
VII. COLLECTIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND 
RESTRUCTURING OF THE COOPERATIVE 
 
Collective entrepreneurship is a phenomenon 
typically present in producer-owned firms. Not only 
are the assets of the CF owned by a group of 
producers, formally associated in the cooperative 
society, also the traditional organizational feature of 
bottom-up decision-making makes the cooperative an 
example of true entrepreneurship. However, 
cooperatives have experienced a number restructuring 
processes of the last decade, which affect extent of 
entrepreneurship in the organization.  
 First, cooperatives have become larger and more 
international, making it more difficult for the 
cooperative to really engage (all) members in the 
decision-making process. The larger the cooperative, 
the more layers of representation there will be 
between the individual member and the board of 
directors. Large cooperatives increasingly mimic the 
corporate governance structure of Plc’s. This, 
eventually, will lead to lower entrepreneurship in the 
cooperative as the managers of the CF will either 
avoid making risky investments or will increasingly 
pursue their own interests.  
 Second, cooperatives have become more market 
oriented, increasing their effort in responding to 
customer demands. This, at instances, has lead to a 
shift from producer orientation towards customer 
orientation. As customer orientation requires 
knowledge and skills of marketing, the judgment of 
the (marketing) managers becomes relatively more 
important than the judgment of the MFs (the owners 
of the CF). If this shift in strategic orientation means 
that owners and managers no longer jointly decide on 
future projects, it also entails a loss of 
entrepreneurship. 
 Third, cooperatives have developed hybrid 
ownership structure in order to be able to attract 
additional equity capital. Inviting non-members to 
become owners could lead to a loss of 
entrepreneurship when these new owners have 
different interests than the members. Having 
diverging interests among the owners will either lead 
to laborious decision-making or it will lead to 
managers taking advantage of the situation by 
pursuing their own interests. However, when the new 
owners - if allowed by the membership - take an 
active stand in the decision-making process (similar to 
that of activist shareholders in Plc’s) the extent of 
entrepreneurship may be increased.  
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 Finally, the current trend of establishing many 
new small cooperatives, either outside of even 
within existing cooperatives, leads to an increase 
in entrepreneurship. In small cooperatives, 
members have a direct line with the managers, 
often discussing not only strategic but even 
operational decisions. Commitment of the 
members is high, leading to strong involvement in 
the decision-making process. Investment decisions 
are the outcome of judgment of both owners and 
managers.  
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we have defined entrepreneurship as 
judgmental decision-making over the deployment 
of assets in the face of uncertainty. Real 
entrepreneurship requires that the owners of the 
assets make the decisions about the use of the 
assets. In many firms, however, owners and 
managers have become alienated, leading to low 
entrepreneurship or even quasi-entrepreneurship.  
 In the producer-owned firm, commitment of 
owners to the decision-making process has always 
been high. Due to a shift from producer orientation 
towards customer orientation, commitment is 
decreasing, leading to lower entrepreneurship. 
Still, an extension of ownership towards non-
members could reinforce entrepreneurship in the 
cooperative. Also the rise of many new small 
cooperatives offers a promising route towards 
more entrepreneurship. 
 The paper only begins to unravel the concept of 
collective entrepreneurship. One issue for further 
study that is both important and promising in terms 
of useful results deals with the decision-making 
processes within the association of owners of the 
producer-owned firm. When the membership 
becomes more heterogeneous, and particular 
groups of members are formed, an interesting 
dynamics of coalition building will appear. The 
implications of this political process for 
entrepreneurship are, to our contention, a fruitful 
direction for further research. 
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